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PAWNS OR PEOPLE? PROTECTING THE BEST
INTERESTS OF CHILDREN IN INTERSTATE
CUSTODY DISPUTES
I. I NRODUC1ION
Annually, more than one million children are the subject of cus-
tody disputes.' It is well-settled that the child's welfare is the law's
paramount consideration in custody disputes between the child's bio-
logical parents.2 In these cases the child is the focal point. The courts
will consider a wide range of information and have broad discretion in
fashioning a custody decree that is in the child's best interests .3 This
method of deciding custody disputes has become known as the "best
interests test."' 4 This test ensures that the child's interests in securing a
stable and productive home and future are met. In essence the needs
and interests of the child are placed above those of the parents com-
peting for custody.6
These needs and interests are not always met, however, where
one of the parties to the dispute is not a natural parent-a prospective
adoptive parent, for instance. In these cases most states presump-
tively award custody to the natural parent.7 This standard has become
known as the "natural parent preference."8 If strictly applied, this
1. In 1982, 1,108,000 children under the age of 18 were involved in divorce proceed-
ings in 31 states. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE
UNrrED STATES 476 n.2 (2d ed. 1987). The number of those that were the subject of cus-
tody disputes is likely to be much higher because custody actions result not only from
divorce, but also from adoption proceedings, neglect and dependency cases, custody dis-
putes between unmarried parents, and occasionally upon the death of natural parents. Id.
at 476. Additionally, divorce has become a "growth industry." Garry Abrams, Growth
Industry of Divorce Fuels the American Economy, L.A. TiMs, Nov. 16, 1984, § 5, at 1.
During the 1980s custody disputes became a prominent aspect of divorce proceedings as
more fathers began seeking custody and more mothers were willing to relinquish custody.
Debra L. Wallace, When the Child Becomes the Prize-That Child Needs a Lawyer, BAR-
RISTER, Spring 1982, at 16.
2. 2 CLARK, supra note 1, at 527.
3. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
4. See Janet Leach Richards, The Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Ex-
panding the Definition of Parent, 16 NovA L. REv. 733, 734 (1992).
5. Jennifer E. Home, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide
Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2073, 2076 (1993)
(stating "judges will ensure that children are in the best possible home").
6. Richards, supra note 4, at 734.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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usually results in courts automatically awarding custody to the natural
parent-a result that is not necessarily in the child's best interests.9
Application of this standard varies from state to state.10
As this Comment will show, state laws differ as to how and when
courts should apply the best interests test. For instance, Illinois ap-
plies the best interests test to all custody disputes and the natural par-
ent preference is merely one factor the courts consider in determining
the child's best interests.11 Other states such as New York, Wisconsin,
and Iowa apply the best interests test only if the natural parent's rights
are legally terminated-by a showing of abandonment or unfitness,
for instance. 2 Furthermore, the best interests test depends on the
subjective beliefs of judges or court-appointed psychologists. 3 Under
this standard states have varying perceptions of what is best for a child
and often reach inconsistent results. 4
These differing approaches to resolving custody disputes create
some alarming problems. First and foremost, many children are being
denied the opportunity to enjoy the stable and productive homelife
that they deserve. Second, inconsistent application of the best inter-
ests test leads to interstate conflicts over child custody that give rise to
problems such as parental kidnapping 15 and prolonged custody bat-
tles. These conflicts often result in states issuing conflicting custody
decrees.1
6
The solution to this dilemma is twofold. First, we need to estab-
lish a national, uniform method of determining all child custody cases.
9. Id.
10. Compare In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992) (stating best interests of
child are not at issue unless natural parent's rights have been legally terminated) with Rose
v. Potts, 577 N.E.2d 811, 814 (III. App. Ct. 1991) (holding court may award custody to
nonparent without showing natural parent is unfit if doing so is in best interests of child).
11. Rose, 577 N.E.2d at 814.
12. E.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245; Alfredo S. v. Nassau County Dep't of Social
Servs., 568 N.Y.S.2d 123,124-25 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Note, Child Custody, 23 J. FAM. L.
442 (1984-1985) (citing Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479,(Wis. 1984)).
13. Home, supra note 5, at 2076.
14. See Anne B. Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child- A Critical Reexamina-
tion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention
Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 845, 856 n31 (1992).
15. Parental kidnapping is a situation where a parent who is unhappy with a custody
order will take the child from the custodial parent and flee to a more sympathetic jurisdic-
tion. See generally id. at 847-67 (discussing causes of parental kidnapping and defining
"interstate child").
16. See, eg., Esser v. Roach, 829 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Va. 1993); P.C. v. C.C. (In re
A.E.H.), 468 N.W.2d 190 (Wis.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 338 (1991).
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Second, that uniform standard must establish that the needs and inter-
ests of the child are paramount.
Part II of this Comment explains the development of the best
interests test and analyzes the laws governing interstate custody dis-
putes. Part III discusses different ways to achieve a uniform applica-
tion of the best interests test under current custody laws. Part IV
argues that children have a constitutional interest in their own up-
bringing, and this right underlies the need for uniform application of a
best interests test whenever a child's placement is at issue. Finally,
Part V offers possible solutions for the future thaf will protect the best
interests of children by establishing that their needs and interests are
paramount.
II. CURRENT LAW
A. The Best Interests Test and Its Application
The method by which courts have resolved custody disputes has
changed dramatically through the years as child custody law has
evolved from gender-based presumptions into today's best interests of
the child standard. 7 These changes reflect a shift in attitude-the-law
no longer views children as property but now sees them as individual
beings with their own interests.'"
During the early nineteenth century, courts recognized a rebutta-
ble presumption that fathers had an absolute right to custody of their
children unless they were found to be unfit as parents. 9 This paternal
presumption started to give way in the 1840s as courts began to recog-
nize that the child's welfare was the "paramount consideration" in
custody disputes.2' At the same time, state lawmakers began passing
legislation that gave courts discretion in custody matters, removed
gender presumptions, and instructed courts to consider only the wel-
fare of the child 2 l
17. See generally Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 688-95 (Ala. 1981) (discussing com-
mon-law development of child custody).
18. Home, supra note 5, at 2078.
19. See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modem American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, in LAw, SocIETY, AND DoMESTmC RELA-
TIONS: MAJOR IhSTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 651, 675-76 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987); see
also Devine, 398 So. 2d at 688-89 (stating father had "absolute" right to custody of his
children and that mother "was without any rights to the care and custody of her minor
children").
20. Zainaldin, supra note 19, at 682-83.
21. Id. at 683.
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Courts in the mid-nineteenth century formulated new perceptions
and new gender-based presumptions regarding custody based on child
welfare and natural law.2 These included a "tender years" or "mater-
nal" presumption that assumed the mother was better equipped to
care for young children due to their special needs. 3 Also, courts pre-
sumed that older boys should be in the custody of their father, who
was considered better suited to supervise boys' development and edu-
cation.2 At the same time, courts also began to recognize children's
emotional attachments and wishes concerning their placement.8
During the twentieth century, most states did away with all gen-
der-based presumptions.26 Today it is well-settled that in divorce cus-
tody proceedings or other custody disputes involving a child's natural
parents, the best interests of the child is the law's paramount consider-
ation.27 Many states have enacted statutes requiring courts to con-
sider the best interests of the child in divorce custody proceedings.
8
Other states follow this approach as a matter of common law.29 The
best interests test, however, is open-ended and, even where criteria
are statutorily established, the judge has discretion to consider a wide
range of facts and make a subjective assessment of the child's best
interests .3  Additionally, many jurisdictions only apply the best inter-
ests test to custody disputes between the natural parents. They do not
apply the test to disputes between a natural parent and a third party
22. Id. at 685.
23. Id. at 685-86. "Tender age" was defined as infancy through the eleventh or twelfth
birthday. Id. at 685 n.151.
24. Id. at 686.
25. Id. at 686-87.
26. However, at least two states still appear to apply the tender years doctrine. Linda
D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 485, 502 (1994) (citing
Wheeler v. Gill, 413 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) and Malone v. Malone, 842 S.W.2d
621, 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)).
27. See, e.g., Rester v. Manuel, 619 So. 2d 655, 658 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Brauch v.
Shaw, 432 A.2d 1, 5 (N.H. 1981); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 853 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993);
State ex rel Kiger v. Hancock, 168 S.E.2d 798,799 (W. Va. 1969); 2 CLARK, supra note 1, at
479.
28. See, e.g., CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 3021, 3040 (West 1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750,
para. 5/602 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 131 (West Supp. 1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(2) (1993); Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994).
29. See, eg., In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 1984); Ash v. Ash,
622 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Miss. 1993); S.M. v. SJ., 363 A.2d 353,355 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1976); Fnlay v. F'mlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925); Commonwealth ex reL Robinson v.
Robinson, 478 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. 1984).
30. For example, Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 402 provides that:
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absent a showing that the natural parent is unfit or has abandoned the
child.31
Courts applying the natural parent preference assume that plac-
ing the child with its natural parents is in the child's best interests.32
This result, however, often is not in the best interests of the child.
33
For instance, the presumption mandates that many children must be
removed from stable, loving environments with third parties to be
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the
child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or par-
ents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's
best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not
affect his relationship to the child.
UmF. MARRI G AND DIVORcE Acr § 402, 9A U.L.A. 147, 561 (1988).
31. See, e.g., Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Ark. 1988) ("[O]ur case law
specifically establishes a preference for natural parents in custody matters, and provides
that the preference must prevail unless it is established that the natural parent is unfit.");
In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239,245 (Iowa 1992) (stating adoptive parent must show natural
parent's rights have been legally terminated before court will consider best interests of
child); Alfredo S. v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 568 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (holding question of child's best interests does not arise without threshold
showing of abandonment or unfitness). But see Rose v. Potts, 577 N.E.2d 811, 813-14 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding court may award custody to nonparent without showing natural
parent is unfit if in best interests of child).
At least one commentator has suggested expanding the natural parent preference to a
third party who has acted as a parent toward the child in order to protect the best interests
of the child. Richards, supra note 4, at 736.
32. Richards, supra note 4, at 736.
"This rule is based logically upon the experience of mankind that blood is thicker
than water and that a natural parent will normally expend greater effort and sacri-
fice on behalf of a child than will a stranger or a third party, especially when the
going gets rough in times of economic, medical or other difficulty."
Id. (quoting In re Custody of Hampton, 5 ADAMS Co. LJ. 84, 91 (Pa. C.P. 1963)); see also
Brooke Ashlee Gershon, Throwing out the Baby with the Bath Water: Adoption of Kelsey
S. Raises the Rights of Unwed Fathers Above the Best Interests of the Child, 28 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 741, 746 (1995) (stating that each jurisdiction applies "'parental presumption'-that
placement of a child with his or her biological parents is generally in the best interests of
that child" (quoting John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis of Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 364 (1991))). Should courts
really make this assumption? See David Van Biema, Parents Who Kill, TMMe, Nov. 14,
1994, at 50.
33. Richards, supra note 4, at 734.
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placed in the custody of natural parents with whom these children
have had virtually no contact?
Another shortcoming in the natural parent preference lies in its
name. Who is the "natural" parent? Medical advances such as surro-
gate motherhood make this distinction unclear. 5 Such technological
breakthroughs pose new problems in child custody law by making it
increasingly difficult to define a natural parent.3 6 Who will the pre-
sumption favor in these cases?
In sum the best justification for the natural parent preference is
that it fosters judicial economy, predictability, and consistency. 37 Un-
fortunately, these interests are not always consistent with those of the
child. 8
As this Comment has discussed, custody law varies from state to
state. Differing policies have resulted in conflicts among the states as
to the applicability of the best interests test and the weight to be af-
forded children's best interests.
B. Laws Governing Interstate. Custody Disputes
Currently there are two laws governing interstate custody dis-
putes, the'Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)39 and
the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA).40 The PKPA is a fed-
34. Id.; see infra notes 101, 121 and accompanying text; see also Gershon, supra note
32, at 746 (stating that when child is denied opportunity to develop close bonds early in
life, child will have difficulty forming close relationships later in life).
35. A surrogate arrangement is an agreement in which a woman-the surrogate-
agrees by contract to be impregnated by artificial insemination and to carry the child to
term. Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy and Adoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM.
HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988). She then turns the child over to the other contracting
party, the biological father for instance, and surrenders all of her parental rights. Id.
36. See, eg., Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84,851 P.2d 776,19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993).
In Calvert a surrogate mother was impregnated by an embryo created by the sperm and
egg of a married couple. Id. at 87, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. Prior to the
birth of the child, the surrogate refused to relinquish custody. Id. at 88, 851 P.2d at 778, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. The couple and the surrogate each filed separate actions to be de-
clared the legal parents of the unborn child. Id. Under California law all three persons are
the child's natural parents-the surrogate because she gave birth to the child and the
couple because they are genetically related to the child. Id. at 89-90, 851 P.2d at 779-80,19
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 497-98. The court ruled that the surrogate was not the legal mother based
on the intentions manifested in the surrogacy agreement. Id. at 93, 851 P.2d at 782, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 500. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Question of Parenthood,
76 GEo. LJ. 1811 (1988) (discussing which party is parent in surrogacy arrangements).
37. Richards, supra note 4, at 760.
38. Id.
39. 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 115 (1988).
40. Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6-10, 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-3574 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1988) and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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eral act and the UCCJA is a uniform act that has been adopted by all
fifty states.41 These acts set guidelines that states must meet in order
to assume jurisdiction in child custody cases.42 They also require
states to recognize and enforce prior custody orders issued by other
states that had properly exercised jurisdiction under the acts.43 How-
ever, the acts only address jurisdiction and enforcement of custody
orders. They do not require a state that meets the jurisdictional re-
quirements to decide custody matters in the best interests of the
child. 4 This is ironic, considering that a key motivating factor in the
implementation of this legislation was the welfare and interests of the
children who are caught in the middle of these disputes. 45
1. UCCJA
In 1968 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Bar Association approved the UCCJA
in response to the problems associated with interstate custody dis-
putes.46 It has since been adopted by all fifty states and the District of
Columbia.47 The UCCJA was drafted to solidify the prior "quicksand
foundation" of interstate custody law that had often led to states issu-
ing conflicting custody decrees. The UCCJA accomplishes this goal
by establishing greater certainty concerning which state can exercise
jurisdiction over an interstate custody dispute and ensuring that a
custody decree issued by one state is entitled to enforcement in
another.49
The problems surrounding interstate custody disputes arose be-
cause custody matters were left to "autonomous state tribunals," each
with differing policies regarding jurisdiction and differing substantive
rules for adjudicating child custody.50 This often encouraged parties
that were denied custody to take the child, relocate, and relitigate cus-
tody cases in different states, where they could seek either a new cus-
41. 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 20, 20-21 (Supp. 1994) (table of jurisdictions adopting UCCJA).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (1988); UNw. CHILD CUSTODY JUIRISDICrION Acr § 3, 9
U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a); UNiP. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICrION Acr § 13,9 U.L.A. pt.
1, at 276.
44. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 61-65, 79 and accomphnying text.
46. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDIcrION Acr prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 116.
47. 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 20, 20-21 (Supp. 1994) (table of jurisdictions adopting UCCIA).
48. UNrF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION Acr prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 116.
49. Id.
50. Goldstein, supra note 14, at 853-54.
January 1995]
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tody decree or a modification of the prior one.51 Compounding this
problem, child custody orders are not considered "final" judgments
because they are subject to modification until the child reaches matur-
ity; thus, custody decrees are not subject to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.52
Attempting to bring stability to interstate custody disputes, the
UCCJA attacks these problems by establishing guidelines to define
which state may exercise jurisdiction over a matter5 3 Also, the
UCCJA requires states, except in limited circumstances, to enforce a
prior decree issued by another state and to refrain from making its
own custody determination. 4
The UCCJA establishes four grounds upon which a state may as-
sume jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination: (1) the
forum is the child's "home" state; (2) the child and at least one con-
testant have a "significant connection" with the forum; (3) the child is
physically present in the forum and an emergency requires the court
to make a custody determination; or (4) no other state has jurisdiction
under the UCCJA 5 Since a state must satisfy only one of the four
requirements to assume jurisdiction, it is possible for more than one
state to meet the UCCJA's requirements at the same time. Therefore,
two states may have concurrent jurisdiction over the same matter. 6
To minimize these occurrences, section six provides that a state
that would otherwise have jurisdiction over a matter must abstain
from exercising its jurisdiction if there is a proceeding pending in an-
other state. 7 Also, the UCCJA allows a state to modify a final decree
issued by another state only where: (1) it appears that the court that
rendered the initial decree no longer has jurisdiction or has declined
51. Id. at 847.
52. The Full Faith and Credit Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. Since child custody orders are not final judicial determinations,
the Constitution does not require that states recognize and enforce such rulings made by
sister states. See Scott T. Dickens, Note, The Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act: Applica-
tion and Interpretation, 23 J. FAM. L. 419, 419-20 (1984-1985); see also Bennett v. Bennett,
595 F. Supp. 366,367 (D.D.C. 1984) ("The Supreme Court has more than once declined to
require that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution be applied to
child custody decrees, which are by nature ever-modifiable.").
53. UNrF. CILD CUSTODY JURISDICTON ACT § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44.
54. Id. §§ 13, 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 276, 292.
55. Id. § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44..
56. See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 914 ("[E]ven after the UCCJA was widely
adopted, in every contested custody case the possibility that a new forum would both take
jurisdiction and reach a more favorable result remained clearly present.").
57. UNIF. CILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 6, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 219-20.
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to exercise its jurisdiction; and (2) the modifying state has jurisdiction
under the Act."8 Additionally, since the enactment of the PKPA,
some courts and commentators argue that concurrent jurisdiction is
not possible because the PKPA preempts the UCCJA.59 Under this
theory, the child's "home state" has exclusive jurisdiction.'
The UCCJA's main focus is the welfare of the children who are
the victims of interstate custody battles.61 The UCCJA seeks to pro-
vide "stability of environment and continuity of affection" for the
child.62 It creates great flexibility in determining which state will have
jurisdiction in order to ensure that the best interests of the child are
protected.63 Additionally, courts have held that the paramount con-.
cern underlying the UCCJA is the welfare and interests of the child.'
Thus, the state that can best decide the case in the interests of the
child should assume jurisdiction.65
2. PKPA
The PKPA, enacted in 1980, was Congress's response to the
problems of interstate custody disputes.66 States that had not yet
adopted the UCCJA were not bound by its provisions, and many ex-
perts felt that even those states that did enact the UCCJA were not
adequately following its guidelines.67 The PKPA was enacted to force
states that had not adopted the UCCJA to reach the same results as
58. ld. § 14, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 292.
59. Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1992); Wallace v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
App. 4th 1182, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 157 (1993); Roger M. Baron, Federal Preemption in the
Resolution of Child Custody Jurisdiction Disputes, 45 Anx. L. REv. 885, 891-92 (1993).
But see Esser v. Roach, 829 F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D. Va. 1993) (both Virginia and North
Carolina courts found they had jurisdiction over same custody dispute and issued conflict-
ing decrees).
60. See Wallace, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1186, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
61. UNiF. Cmw CUSTODY JURasDIcrIoN Acr prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 116.
62. Id.
63. Henry H. Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 297, 302 (1981).
64. E.g., Hopson v. Hopson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 884, 895, 168 Cal. Rptr. 345, 353 (1980);
Marlow v. Marlow, 471 N.Y.S.2d 201, 205 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
65. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 663 S.W.2d 190, 191 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Counts v.
Bracken, 494 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Green v. Green, 276 N.W.2d 472,475-
76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); Brauch v. Shaw, 432 A.2d 1, 6 (N.H. 1981).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose
(quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(a), 94 Stat. 3566, 3568-69 (1980))).
67. See Goldstein, supra note 14, at 887-914 (explaining that courts continue to exer-
cise concurrent jurisdiction under UCCIA).
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those states that had and to "plug" what-the drafters of the PKPA saw
as "loopholes" in the UCCJA.P
The PKPA applies the Full Faith and Credit Clause6 9 to custody
decrees70 and contains jurisdictional guidelines similar to those found
in the UCCJA.71 The major difference between the PKPA and the
UCCJA lies in their differing approaches to the modification of cus-
tody decrees.
The PKPA provides that a state can modify a decree issued by
another state only where the state that made the initial decree no
longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise its jurisdiction.72 In
all other cases, the PKPA establishes continuing jurisdiction in the ini-
tial state;73 once a state makes an initial custody determination, that
state alone has continuing jurisdiction to modify the order. Jurisdic-
tion continues as long as that state both has jurisdiction under its own
laws and is the residence of the child or any contestant.74 Thus, under
the PKPA a state can modify its prior decree even if it is no longer the
child's home state or does not otherwise have a significant connection
68. Id. at 850-51. Courts have interpreted the UCCJA as permitting concurrent juris-
diction. Id. at 914. This interpretation has continued to encourage parental kidnapping.
Id.
69. See supra note 52.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A is titled "Full faith and credit given to child custody
determinations."
71. The PKPA states:
A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with
the provisions of this section only if-
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such state; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State-of the child .... or (ii) had been the
child's home State within six months before the date of the commencement of the,
proceeding... ;
(B)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under sub-
paragraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such
State assume jurisdiction because (I) ... the child and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with such State .... and (II) there is available in
such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, pro-
tection, training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has
been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child be-
cause he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D)(i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction .... or
another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction .... and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction ....
28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c).
72. Id. § 1738A(f).
73. Id. § 1738A(d).
74. Id.
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to the child as long as that state still has jurisdiction under its own laws
and is the residence of "any contestant."'75
By contrast, the UCCJA compels a state to apply the same juris-
dictional test to modification proceedings as it would to an initial cus-
tody determination.76 This requires any state, including the state that
issued the initial decree, to have "home state," "significant connec-
tion," or "emergency" jurisdiction to modify a decree unless no other
state has jurisdiction and it is in the child's best interests to do so 7
The UCCJA does not recognize strict continuing jurisdiction in the
home state. Thus, the UCCJA appears to be more conscious of chil-
dren's interests than the PKPA. This consciousness is reflected in the
UCCJA's greater flexibility, which ensures that the state in the best
position to consider the child's interests will have jurisdiction to issue
or modify a decree.7
Despite the procedural differences between the acts, the best in-
terests of the child was also a key motivating factor behind the enact-
ment of the PKPA.79 However, neither the PKPA nor the UCCJA
requires a state to make custody determinations based on the best
interests of the child. They merely set out which state will have juris-
diction when an interstate dispute arises.
3.' Applying the PKPA and UCCJA to interstate custody disputes
While an interest in safeguarding the welfare of children inspired
both acts, the PKPA and UCCJA only address matters of jurisdiction
and enforcement in interstate custody disputes80 They do not require
states to recognize a child's best interests in fashioning a custody de-
cree. They only accomplish the reduction of jurisdictional battles and
the increase of comity among the states."' It may be true that these
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. UNnF. CHIM CUSTODY JURISDICrON Act § 3, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44; see also
Goldstein, supra note 14, at 926 (noting PKPA adopted concept of continuing jurisdiction).
77. Urne. CmLD CUSTODY JURISDICION ACT § 3(a), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143-44.
78. Foster, supra note 63, at 302-03.
79. Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 105 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Child and
Human Development of the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources United States Senate,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Charles McC. Ma-
thias, Jr., acting chairman).
80. See supra parts II.B.1-2.
81. "The rampant jurisdictional competition common among state courts before the
UCCA and the PKPA no longer seems to occur." Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 369, 369 (1991). But see Goldstein, supra
note 14, at 847-50, 939 (arguing acts do not provide consistency or predictability, nor do
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laws, to some extent, further the welfare of children by reducing litiga-
tion; however, they fall far short of safeguarding the best interests of
children. States are still free to give whatever weight they desire to
the interests of children and, in many cases, are even free to ignore
those interests.' While the legislative histories of these laws stress the
best interests of the child, this is nothing more than rhetoric.
83
Consider the testimony of Mr. George F. Doppler" during the
Senate committee hearings prior to the passage of the PKPA. 5 Ques-
tioning the effectiveness of the PKPA, Mr. Doppler reported the fol-
lowing scenario:
A four-year-old boy was held over an open, lit, gas jet
by his mother burning off his nose, his eyes so badly burned
the lids were gone, his mouth burned to a continuously open
position, the whole face a solid mass of scar tissue. A doctor
the father took the boy to said he didn't see how the child
had kept from breathing so long, for had he, the heat would
have burned his lungs and killed him. The judge still
awarded custody to the mother along with the other
children.s
This scenario demonstrates two flaws in the PKPA. First, the PKPA
does not require courts to determine cases in the best interests of the
child; thus, it would not prevent results such as those described by Mr.
Doppler. Second, it would appear that, in a scenario such as this, the
child's best interests would be served by the father removing the child
to another jurisdiction to relitigate the custody issue-a result that is
not allowed under the PKPA.87
The PKPA does not protect children's interests. The only way to
accomplish this is by forcing courts to determine all custody disputes
in the best interests of the child. The PKPA does not address this
they discourage "self-help" child snatching; cases under UCCJA and PKPA are similar to
those that preceded acts).
82. See infra notes 104, 111 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 61-65, 79 and accompanying text.
84. Mr. Doppler was the national coordinator of the National Council of Marriage and
Divorce Law Reform and Justice Organizations. Hearings, supra note 79, at 87.
85. Id. at 92.
86. Id. at 94.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose
(quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c)(6), 94 Stat. 3566,3569 (1080))) (stating purpose of Act
is to deter "unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody").
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issue.88 Was Mr. Doppler right to suggest that the PKPA is merely
"'sweep it under the rug' type legislation?"8 9
This example demonstrates, as will the cases that follow in this
Comment, that the real problems in child custody disputes go beyond
the jurisdictional questions and find their roots in deeper substantive
issues. Thus, while they do provide fairly definite jurisdictional guide-
lines, the PKPA and UCCJA are simply a very small step in the right
direction.
C. Problems Under the Current Scheme
Several recent cases involving interstate custody disputes expose
the deficiencies in the current scheme of determining child custody.90
Applying the UCCJA and PKPA, these cases demonstrate the lack of
attention children's best interests are receiving as well as the suffering
and emotional instability children endure as a result.
During the summer of 1993, the nation was introduced to the
fierce custody battle over the little girl known as "Baby Jessica."91
This case arose out of a custody dispute between Jessica's prospective
adoptive parents in Michigan, Roberta and Jan DeBoer, and her natu-
ral father in Iowa, Daniel Schmidt.
After Jessica was born on February 8, 1991, her mother, Cara,
who was unmarried at the time, decided to give Jessica up for adop-
tion.9 She named her friend Scott as the father.93 Both Cara and
Scott signed a release of parental rights, and a termination hearing
was held.94 Cara and Scott's parental rights were terminated and cus-
tody of Jessica was granted to the DeBoers, the prospective adoptive
parents.95 The DeBoers then brought Jessica to their home in
Michigan.96
88. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
89. Hearings, supra note 79, at 94; see also Steven G. Shutter, Parental Kidnaping Pre-
vention Act-Panacea or Toothless 71ger?, 55 FLA. BJ. 479, 479 (1981) (stating PKPA was
enacted as "a last minute amendment" to bill providing Medicare coverage of pneumococ-
cal vaccine).
90. See, e.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); P.C. v. C.C. (In re A.E.H.), 468
N.W.2d 190 (Wis.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 338 (1991); Eric Harrison, Her Dream Becomes
a Nightmare, L.A. TIMes, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al.
91. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TnMM, July 19, 1993, at 44.
92. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 240.
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich.), stay denied sub
nom. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993) (application for stay of enforcement made to
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Nine days after the termination, hearing, Cara fied a motion to
revoke the release of custody.97 She admitted that she had lied about
the identity of Jessica's father and revealed that Daniel Schmidt was
the natural father.98 Schmidt subsequently filed a paternity action in
Iowa district court.9 On December 27, 1991, the district court found
that Schmidt was the biological father, that his parental rights had not
been properly terminated, and that the DeBoers' petition to adopt
Jessica must be. denied. 10°
The case was litigated up to the Iowa Supreme Court. During
this time-approximately one and one-half years-Jessica lived with
the DeBoers in Michigan and never saw her natural father.10 1 How-
ever, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision
awarding custody to the natural father.a The Iowa Supreme Court
held that the father's parental rights had not been properly termi-
nated, that the adoption proceedings were "fatally flawed," and that
the DeBoers were not entitled to custody.
10 3
In making this determination, the court never considered Jessica's
best interests.104 The court even recognized that Daniel Schmidt had
a "poor performance record as a parent." 0" He had two other chil-
dren-a twelve-year-old daughter and a fourteen-year-old son-
whom he had; "largely failed to support" and had "failed to maintain
Justice Stevens as Circuit Justice for Sixth Circuit), and stay denied sub nom. DeBoer v.
Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993) (application for stay made to Justice Blackmun referred to
entire Court).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 652-53. There was evidence that Daniel knew that he was Jessica's father
prior to the birth and that he simply did nothing to protect his parental rights prior to the
adoption, raising further doubt about the outcome of this case. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 247
(Snell, J., dissenting).
101. See DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting).
102. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
103. Id. at 244-45.
104. The Iowa district court held that a best interests analysis was not appropriate with-
out a prior showing of abandonment. This was affirmed by the appellate courts. Id. at 245.
105. Id. Experts argue that the Schmidts have performed well as parents since receiving
custody of Jessica. See Michele Ingrassia & Karen Springen, She's Not Baby Jessica Any-
more, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 21, 1994, at 60. While this is fortunate for Jessica, the Schmidts are
arguably the exception, not the norm. Since this case began the Schmidts have been under
close public scrutiny and were even portrayed in a network television movie. See, e.g.,
Chris Willman, Insta-Drama "Baby Jessica" Cries out for Perspective, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1993, at F15. Given these circumstances, it only makes sense that they would make every
effort to be good parents. However, other parents are not under such pressures to perform
well, so the Schmidts cannot be used to justify application of the natural parent preference
in place of the best interests test-the ends do not justify the means.
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meaningful contact with."'1 6 At the same time, the DeBoers had
"provided exemplary care for the child [and] view[ed] themselves as
the parents of th[e] child in every respect" and were the only family
Jessica had known in her two years of life. °7 The court nevertheless
concluded that while the best interests of Jessica was a "very alluring
argument," Jessica's best interests were not at issue since her father
had not legally terminated his parental rights."'8
The DeBoers then petitioned the Michigan courts for an order
enjoining enforcement of the Iowa judgment or, in the alternative, a
new custody determination."° The Michigan Supreme Court denied
their request, holding that under the UCCJA and PKPA it was re-
quired to enforce the prior judgment of the Iowa court, even if the
Iowa court did not consider the child's best interests." 0 The Michigan
court stated that the UCCJA and PKPA are procedural statutes that
do not contain a substantive requirement to, apply a best interests
test."' Thus, the court reasoned, each state is free to fashion its own
substantive laws regarding family relations, as long as these laws are
within constitutional limits, and another state is not authorized to
modify or refuse to enforce the prior order based on a disagreement
over substantive policy." 2
The DeBoers relied primarily on the New Jersey case E.E.B. v.
D.A.1 3 In that case the New Jersey Supreme Court held unanimously
that it was authorized under.the UCCJA and PKPA to refuse to en-
force a prior Ohio custody decree wherein the Ohio court failed to
consider the best interests of the child." 4 The court reasoned that the
spirit of the two acts is to ensure that the state to decide a custody
dispute is "the one best positioned to make the decision based on the
best interest of the child.""' 5 The court "concluded that it was not re-
quired to exercise "blind obedience to home state jurisdiction.""' 6
Where one state fails to consider the best interests of the child, and
106. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 653.
110. 14 at 660-61.
111. ML
112. Id
113. 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982).
114. ML at 877.
115. Md at 879. "This result comports with the congressional intent that child custody
decisions be made in the state best able to determine the best interest of the child." Md at
877.
116. Id. at 879.
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where another state properly has jurisdiction under the acts, the latter
state may modify or refuse to enforce the prior decree after making a
best interests determination." 7 A majority of the Michigan court,
however, specifically rejected this approach." 8
Justice Levin, dissenting in DeBoer, argued that the majority's
approach was analogous to that typically found in a case "concerning
the ownership, the legal title, to a bale of hay." 1 9 However, as Justice
Levin pointed out, the majority apparently failed to recognize that this
was not the usual "A v. B" lawsuit.120 Rather, this case involved a
young child, whose life and welfare was at stake and who, following
the court's ruling, would be told that "she is not Jessie, that the
DeBoers are not Mommy and Daddy, that her name is Anna Lee
Schmidt, and that the Schmidts, whom she has never met, are Mommy
and Daddy."'' But Baby Jessica had rights and interests of her own,
separate from those of the named litigants. The failure to conduct a
best interests hearing ignored those rights and effectively treated Jes-
sica as a piece of property in which her biological father had a posses-
sory-type interest. 22
Justice Levin agreed with the New Jersey Supreme Court's opin-
ion that the PKPA does not require a state to enforce a prior custody
decree if that decree was entered without a best interests determina-
tion. 23 In defending this approach, he wrote:
The superior claim of the child to be heard in this case is
grounded not just in law, but in basic human morality.
Adults like the Schmidts and the DeBoers make choices in
their lives, and society holds them responsible for their
choices. When adults are forced to bear the consequences of
their choices, however disastrous, at least their character and
personality have been fully formed, and that character can
provide the foundation for recovery, the will to go on.
117. Id. at 877.
118. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 660.
119. Id. at 668 (Levin, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Levin, J., dissenting).
121. Id at 669 (Levin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 670 (Levin, J., dissenting).
"The parental right doctrine has acquired rigidity from the dubious and
amorphous principle that the natural parent has some sort of constitutional 'right'
to the custody of his child. This principle comes dangerously close to treating the
child in some sense as the property of his parent, an unhappy analogy .... "
Id. (Levin, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THM LAw OF DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONS IN THE UNrTED STATES 532 (2d ed. 1987)).
123. Id. at 672 (Levin, J., dissenting).
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The character and personality of a child two and one-
half years old is just beginning to take shape. To visit the
consequences of adult choices upon the child during the
formative years of her life . . . is unnecessarily harsh and
without legal justification. The PKPA does not require this
result.
The PKPA was enacted to protect the child. This
[c]ourt, by ignoring obvious issues concerning the welfare of
the child and by focusing exclusively on the concerns of com-
peting adults, as if this were a dispute about the vesting of
contingent remainders, reduces the PKPA to a robot of legal
formality with results that Congress did not intend.124
Following the Michigan court's decision, the DeBoers applied to
Justice Stevens in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit
for a stay of enforcement."2 Justice Stevens denied the application
for stay on the grounds that the Court would probably not grant certi-
orari to hear the DeBoers' claim and, if it did so, it was not likely to
reverse the lower courts' decisions. 26 Four days later the DeBoers
applied to Justice Blackmun for a stay of enforcement.127 This appli-
cation was referred to the entire Court and again denied.' In a dis-
senting opinion, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, stated:
While I am not sure where the ultimate legalities or equities
lie, I am sure that I am not willing to wash my hands of this
case at this stage, with the personal vulnerability of the child
so much at risk, and with the Supreme Court of New Jersey
and the Supreme Court of Michigan in fundamental disa-
greement over the duty and authority of state courts to con-
sider the best interests of a child when rendering a custody
decree. 29
Thus, there remains a sharp difference of opinion among the
courts over both the status of children's fights in custody cases and the
question of whether the PKPA and UCCJA authorize a state to mod-
124. Id. at 670-71 (Levin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
125. DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993).
126. Id. "Neither Iowa law, Michigan law, nor federal law authorizes unrelated persons
to retain custody of a child whose natural parents have not been found to be unfit.. .." Id.
at 2. This opinion reflects the Court's affirmation of the parental rights doctrine, a princi-
ple that has received much criticism for its treatment of children as property and not as the
individual human beings that they are. See 2 CLARK, supra note 1, at 532.
127. DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993).
128. Id.
129. I& at 11-12.
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ify a custody decree of another state if that state did not consider the
best interests of the child. This question has been answered "yes" by
the New Jersey Supreme Court13 and "no" by the Michigan Supreme
Court.131 Over the dissent of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, the
United States Supreme Court refused to rule on this issue. 32
Since the Supreme Court is the only judicial body with the au-
thority to resolve this conflict, 33 the conflict continues. The outcome
of any particular case may have completely opposite results depending
upon. whether the particular state is sympathetic to New Jersey's or
Michigan's views regarding the duties of the state as they relate to the
best interests of the child. As long as this uncertainty continues, the
UCCJA's and PKPA's primary objective-protecting the welfare of
children-will not be met.
III. ACHIEVING UNIFORM APPLICATION OF THE BEST
INTERE TS TEST
A. The New Jersey Approach
One method of ensuring that a child's best interests are consid-
ered is the approach taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
E.E.B. and later advocated in Judge Levin's dissent in DeBoer.
34
This position received further support in Judge Kennedy's dissenting
opinion in the Washington case In re Marriage of Ieronimakis.35
Judge Kennedy stated that a custody decree not made in the best
interests of the child is not a valid custody determination and, where a
state fails to recognize these interests, it may be assumed that the state
has declined jurisdiction under the UCCJA. '36 If one state determines
that another state has declined jurisdiction, then it is appropriate
under both the UCCJA and PKPA for the former state to modify the
130. E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 877 ("We hold that Ohio's failure to conduct a best interest
hearing constitutes a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2).
Under PKPA, therefore, New Jersey is free to modify the Ohio decree.").
131. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 660-62.
132. See DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. at 11.
133. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 672 (Levin, J., dissenting).
134. See supra notes 113-17, 123-24 and accompanying text.
135. 831 P.2d 172, 180-96 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. Id at 190 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
An equally compelling argument can be made that a decree which is not based on
the best interest of the child is not a "custody determination." Further,... if
there will be no "best interest" determination in the home state, that state may be
deemed to have declined jurisdiction under the ac.
Id. (Kennedy, 3., dissenting).
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prior decree.137 In an earlier case the Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals, applying a different analysis, reached the same result. That
court held that Maryland could-properly exercise "significant connec-
tion" jurisdiction over a matter even though Delaware would have
"home state" jurisdiction because such action was in the best interests
of the child. 38
These opinions are based on the belief that the main concern of
the UCCJA and PKPA is the best -interests of the child and that this
concern overrides the other purposes of the acts.' 39 This echoes the
sentiments of Justice Frankfurter, who wrote, long before the PKPA
was enacted:
Children have a very special place in life which [the] law
should reflect.... But the child's welfare in a custody case
has such a claim upon the State that its responsibility is obvi-
ously 'not to be foreclosed by a prior adjudication reflecting
another State's discharge of its responsibility at another
time.
4°
The major problem with the New Jersey approach is that it
would, in many cases, encourage parental kidnapping in order to se-
cure a forum that will hear arguments concerning the child's best in-
terests. For instance, the DeBoers could have defied the Michigan
and Iowa orders and taken Jessica to New Jersey, where a best inter-
ests hearing would occur.'41 Presumably, such a heaing would result
in a favorable ruling for them. 42 In order to have that decree en-
forced and retain custody of Jessica, however, they would most likely
be required to remain in New Jersey, as it is doubtful that Michigan
would be willing to condone such action by enforcing the New Jersey
137. This assumes that the state meets the jurisdictional requirements of the acts. 28
U.S.C. § 1738A(f) (1988); UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION Acr § 14,9 U.L.A. pt. 1,
at 115, 292 (1988).
138. Etter v. Etter, 405 A.2d 760,763 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); see also UNn'. CHILD
CUSTODY JURISDICTION Acr § 3(a)(2), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 143 (stating court may exercise
jurisdiction if "it is in the best interest of the child ... because (i) the child and his parents,
or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this State").
139. See Foster, supra note 63, at 302-03; Goldstein, supra note 14, at 909; supra notes
65, 115 and accompanying text.
140. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J:, concurring).
141. See E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871 (NJ. 1982).
142. New Jersey, unlike Iowa, applies the best interests test to adoption and other pro-
ceedings between the natural parents and a third party. See id at 877; In re B.G.C., 496
N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992).
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decree.14 3 A similar situation would also exist where all parties lived
in the same state and the child's best interests were ignored.
Additionally, there are many cases where the New Jersey ap-
proach would be inadequate to address the best interests of the child.
For instance, consider the case of Tammy Thomas. Tammy moved to
Los Angeles from Mississippi with her two children in 1988 to escape
the troubles of a bad marriage."' In 1989 Tammy's divorce became
final and Tammy was awarded custody of the children.145 Tammy
then became involved in a relationship with Jake Brown, an African-
American man who she eventually married. 146
During the summer of 1990, Tammy sent her children to Merid-
ian, Mississippi, to visit their paternal grandparents. 147 When the
grandparents learned about Tammy's new relationship, they filed a
custody action in Mississippi court.14 The court found that it had
emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA149 and awarded the grand-
parents temporary custody of the children, holding that it would be
mental abuse to subject the children to an interracial lifestyle.150 'Two
months later, after Tammy married Jake, the court determined it
could make a permanent ruling awarding custody to the grandpar-
ents.1 5' The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected Tammy's appeal.' 2
Tammy has since been able to see the children only on very limited
occasions under the direct supervision of the grandparents. 5 3 At one
time Tammy attempted to take the children: back to California. She
was confronted by their grandmother, who threatened Tammy with a
pistol.-
4
Even if California followed the New Jersey approach, and assum-
ing Tammy would be able to file an action based on a best interests
143. "[E]ach state's courts are sovereign within state boundaries and powerless outside
them. Therefore, any state's judgment will have extraterritorial effect only if another in-
dependent sovereign gives it that effect." Goldstein, supra note 14, at 855.
144. Harrison, supra note 90, at Al.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at A20.
149. A state has jurisdiction over a custody matter if "it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or
abuse...." UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION Act § 3(a)(3)(ii), 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 144.
150. Harrison, supra note 90, at A20.
151. Id.
152. Brown v. Thomas, No. 91-CA-0044, 1992 Miss. LEXIS 437 (Miss. July 22, 1992);
Harrison, supra note 90, at A21.
153. Harrison, supra note 90, at A21.
154. Id.
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theory, such an action would be futile because she is unable to get the
children back to California. A custody decree issued by the California
court would not be enforced by the Mississippi authorities. 55
Tammy's only recourse now appears to be an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court based on Mississippi's violation of her
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 56 Based
on the Court's prior ruling in Palmore, it appears Tammy will eventu-
ally regain custody of her children, But when? She has already been
separated from her children for three years, a very long time in the life
of a child.
Another alternative to ensure that the best interests of children
are properly considered is to open the federal courts to hear these
cases. This would eliminate the incentive to kidnap children to other
states by providing an alternate forum within the child's home state to
adjudicate the child's interests.
B. Federal Jurisdiction
1. Diversity jurisdiction
Litigants who attempt to adjudicate interstate custody disputes in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction5 7 face at least two barri-
ers. First, claimants in these cases would often fail to meet the statu-
tory diversity requirements, such as the amount in controversy
requirement. 58 Second, federal courts have routinely declined to ex-
ercise diversity jurisdiction in domestic relations cases. This absten-
tion has become known as the "domestic relations exception."'159
Courts have offered several justifications to support this exception.
155. See supra note 143.
156. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). In Palmore, the Supreme Court held
that denying a mother custody of her children because she is involved in an interracial
relationship violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 432-34. In Tammy's case, she
would be able to appeal to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1988), which grants the Court discretionary authority to hear appeals from state courts
that turn on a federal question. Here, based on Palmore, Tammy would claim that the
Mississippi court's ruling violates the Equal Protection Clause.
157. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in cases between citizens of differ-
ent states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
158. The amount in controversy must exceed $50,000 in order for the federal courts to
have diversity jurisdiction over a matter. Id. In child custody cases, this requirement
would most likely not be met because, in pure custody disputes, there is no "amount" in
controversy, and the court could not exercise jurisdiction even if it chose not to invoke the
domestic relations exception. See Anthony B. Ullman, Note, The Domestic Relations Ex-
ception to Diversity Jurisdiction, 83 COLUM. L. RPv. 1824, 1848 (1983).
159. The United States Supreme Court has held that federal courts may not exercise
jurisdiction in these cases. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). The Court stated,
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First, courts have stated that domestic cases. Are best determined
at the local level because they involve matters of special local inter-
est.'16 This argument has received much criticism. For instance, the
federal government, as well as the states, has an interest in many do-
mestic relations matters because issues of federal concern often ap-
pear in these cases;161 Also, the presence of a significant state interest
in a matter has.not precluded the federal courts from hearing claims in
other areas of the law.162
Second, federal courts fear that hearing domiestic relations cases
will create a "flood of litigation."'163 However, while domestic rela-
tions cases would add to the federal case load, this would be limited
by the fact that parties to custody cases are not typically of diverse
citizenship. For example, in divorce cases, which comprise a large
number of custody actions," the spouses usually reside in the same
state and do not usually relocate to separate states. 65
Federal courts also justify the exception by pointing out that
these cases require continuing judicial supervision to reevaluate them
in light of changed circumstances. 166 The Supreme Court has recog-
nized, however, thatin some cases such continued monitoring is ap-
propriate and within the equity power of the federal couits. 67
"[t]he whole subject of the lomestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, be-
longs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." Id. See generally
Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, f021-24 (3d Cir. 1975) (explaining development of
domestic relations exception). For examples of application of the exception, see Wasser-
man v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982); Csibi v.
Fustos, 670 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1982).
160. See, e.g., Csibi, 670 F.2d at 136-37; Dickens, supra note 52, at 429-30; Ullman,
supra note 158, at 1846.
161. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that awarding custody to
father because mother engaged in interracial relationship violates Equal Protection
Clause); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that granting husband unilat-
eral right to dispose of community property violates Equal Protection Clause); Ullman,
supra note 158, at 1846-47.
'162. For an example of eminent domain cases where a substantial state interest did not
preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction see Ullman, supra note 158, at 1847
n.141.
163. Id. at 1847. This concern was also raised in the Senate hearings prior to the passage
of the PKPA. See Hearings, supra note 79, at 104.
164. See supra note 1.
165. See Ullman, supra note 158, at 1847.
166. Id. at 1848.
167. "'We are not doubtful of the power of a court of equity to modify an injunction in
adaptation to changed conditions...' Thus, federal courts retaining jurisdiction in domes-
tic cases would cause no departure from the normal rule of federal equity jurisdiction." Id.
(quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)).
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Finally, federal courts claim that state courts are more competent
in domestic matters than the federal courts; thus, it is not appropriate
for federal courts to assume jurisdiction in these matters.1' 8 However,
many federal courts have heard and competently disposed of domestic
matters. 69 Furthermore, this argument is "circular" in that federal
courts claim the exception because they lack expertise, but the only
way to obtain expertise is to gain experience in handling these
cases.170  , .,
In sum, the justifications behind the domestic relations exception
seem shaky at best. The exception is a judicially, created doctrine that
"goes against the basic purpose that underlies the grant of federal di-
versity jurisdiction-assuring that nonresident litigants have their dis-
putes adjudicated free from local bias."'' Local bias can have a
significant impact in child custody cases. 72 Instead of finding excuses
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, federal courts should assume
their responsibility in these matters.
Unfortunately, if a litigant gets into federal court based on diver-
sity jurisdiction, the Erie doctrine provides that the federal court must
apply state substantive law.173 Under this doctrine, whether or not a
best interests determination is made depends upon the state law and,
as this Comment has shown, there are often situations where state
laws do not call for a best interests determination.'
2. Federal question jurisdiction
After the PKPA was enacted, interstate custody suits were
brought in federal courts based on federal question jurisdiction. 75
168. Csibi, 670 F.2d at 137; Michael Finch & Jerome Kasriel, Federal Court Correction of
State Court Error: The Singular Case on Interstate Custody Disputes, 48 OHio ST. LJ. 927,
946-47 (1987); Ullman, supra note 158, at 1849.
169. For example, the Third Circuit routinely hears domestic cases appealed from the
Virgin Islands and has not had difficulty in fulfilling this role. See, e.g., Francois v. Fran-
cois, 599 F2d 1286 (3d Cir.' 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1021 (1980).
170. See Ullman, supra note 158, at 1849.
171. Id. at 1843.
172. Se4 g., Harrison, supra note 90, at Al; see also Ullman, supra note 158, at 1843
(discussing fear of local bias in 'domestic cases).
173. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938).
174. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
175. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all actions "arising under" fed-
eral law. 28 U.S.C: § 1331 (1988). Several courts concluded that federal courts had juris-
diction "to resolve inconsistent state court assertions of jurisdiction" under the PKPA.
Rogers v. Platt, 641 F. Supp. 381, 384 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 814 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see, e.g., DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1984); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d
303 (3d Cir. 1984).
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This door to federal court was closed, however, when the United
States Supreme Court held, in Thompson v. Thompson,176 that the
PKPA does not create a federal cause of action to determine the valid-
ity of conflicting state custody decrees.177
In 1978 Susan and David Thompson filed for divorce in Califor-
nia and were subsequently awarded joint custody of their son, Mat-
thew.1 78 Later Susan decided to move to Louisiana to take a job, and
the California court modified the decree, granting Susan temporary
custody pending the submission of a custody report by a court investi-
gator.179 In 1980 Susan and Matthew moved to Louisiana, and Susan
filed a custody petition in Louisiana state court.180 The Louisiana
court awarded Susan sole custody of Matthew in 1981.181 After re-
viewing the investigator's report two months later, the California
court awarded sole custody of Matthew to David."8 David filed suit
in the District Court for the Central District of California seeking an
order declaring the Louisiana decree invalid and the California decree
valid, and enjoining enforcement of the Louisiana decree." The Dis-
trict Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.1 4
Based on the legislative history of the PKPA, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress intended to extend the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to custody decrees and this itself does not give rise to an im-
plied federal cause of action.'8 5 The Court further held that Congress
did not intend for the federal courts to play an enforcement role re-
garding conflicting state custody decrees and recognized that state
courts regularly and properly enforce the Full Faith and Credit Clause
themselves, without federal supervision.18 6 The Court concluded that
it would not be proper under the PKPA for a federal court to review
David's claim before the Louisiana state appellate courts had an op-
portunity to review the Louisiana judgment. 187
176. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
177. Id. at 187.
178. Id. at 177-78.
179. Id. at 178.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 182.
186. ld. at 183-84.
187. Id.
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The Supreme Court's analysis does nothing to assure that the un-
derlying motivation behind the PKPA will ever receive any attention.
Specifically, the central reasons for the adoption of the PKPA were to
protect the interests of children and to deter parental kidnapping.
88
The Supreme Court's ruling effectively renders the PKPA useless be-
cause, following this decision, state compliance with the PKPA is
purely optional, leaving litigants who fall subject to conflicting decrees
with no mode of enforcing the proper decree. 89 While Congress has
made at least a limited attempt to protect the interests of children by
enacting the PKPA, the Supreme Court has effectively turned these
efforts into "a toothless declaration of unenforceable platitudes."'19
The Thompson decision does not, however, bar any federal re-
view of a claim arising under the PKPA. If there is still a jurisdictional
deadlock between two states after a litigant has appealed through the
highest state court, the litigant may ultimately seek review in the
United States Supreme Court to resolve the federal question raised
under the PKPA.' 91 There are at least three key problems, however,
with limiting federal review to those cases appealed to the Supreme
Court under 28 U.S.C. § i257.
First, it is very time consuming for a litigant to appeal up through
the state courts to the United States Supreme Court. 92 These delays
cause egregious harm to those involved in cases concerning child cus-
tody. Three years or more is a very long time in the life of a child.
Not only does a young child undergo drastic physiological changes
during that time, 93 but it has also been found that strong emotional
and psychological attachments develop within a child in a very short
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A note (1988) (Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose
(quoting Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 7(c), 94 Stat. 3566, 3569 (1980))); see infra note 321 and
accompanying text.
189. "The majority's interpretation of the PKPA would convert an act of Congress into
barren rhetoric." Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1560 (9th Cir. 1986) (Alarcon, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988)..
190. Id at 1562 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
191. The United States Supreme Court has discretionary authority to review decisions
from a state's highest court turning on a federal issue. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988). "Litigants
who have exhausted their state remedies could appeal directly to the United States
Supreme Court from the state supreme court that they contend has violated § 1738A."
Flood, 727 F.2d at 312.
192. "[A]ppellate review is often too slow to be meaningful .... ." Home, supra note 5,
at 2075. For example, Baby Jessica's case spent approximately two years in the state courts
before the application for certiorari was made in the United States Supreme Court. See
supra notes 101, 109 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., PIN!L~oPE LEAcH, YOUR BABY & Cmwo: FROM BrTH TO AGE FIVn
(1989) (explaining chronological development children undergo from birth to age five).
January 1995]
724 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
period of time. 94 Also, there can be little doubt regarding the impor-
tance of a stable environment within the family. Prolonged litigation
concerning child custody, an issue that goes to the core of family life
and parent-child relations, can cause nothing but uncertainty and ap-
prehension regarding the status of the family unit. Therefore, it is
within the best interests of everyone involved, especially the child, to
have custody matters resolved as expeditiously as possible. 9 5
Second, appeals can be quite costly.196 Aggrieved parties may
never exhaust their state remedies and reach the federal courts simply
because they cannot afford to pursue their claim. Finally, even if a
party does appeal through the state system and a jurisdictional conflict
or other unresolved federal issue remains, there is no guarantee that
the United States Supreme Court will hear the case because Supreme
Court review is discretionary.
97
However, even if Thompson were overturned, the PKPA does
not address modification of custody decrees or other substantive is-
sues in determining custody. 98 The PKPA only addresses jurisdiction
and enforcement of decrees that are made consistent with its provi-
sions and does not require a court to consider the best interests of the
child in issuing its decree. 199 Thus, if a decree were made in accord-
194. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET" AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 40-41
(1979) (stating adult who cares for needs of child under two years old "quickly" becomes
potential psychological parent). Forcing a child to break such ties to early relationships
can disrupt the child's ability to form close relationships in the future. Gershon, supra note
32, at 746. Any replacement parent will not likely be able to heal completely the child's
emotional scar from losing a prior parent figure. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra, at 41.
195. The'harm done to children by these experiences can hardly be overestimated.
It does notv require an expert in the behavioral sciences to know that a child,
especially during his early years and the years of growth, needs security and sta-
bility of environment and a continuity of affection. A child... whose personal
attachments when beginning to form are cruelly disrupted, may well be crippled
for life ...
UNnF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 116.
196. Home, sup'ra note 5, at 2076.
197. The Flood court recognized this problem and suggested that this approach is im-
practical given the limited time and resources of the modem Supreme Court. Flood, 727
F.2d at 312.
198. "'[C]onspicuously absent from this comprehensive enactment is any provision cre-
ating or recognizing a direct role for the federal courts in determining child custody.'"
Joan M. Krauskopf, Remedies for Parental Kidnapping in Federal Court: A Comment Ap-
plying the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act in Support of Judge Edwards, 45 OHIO ST.
LJ. 429, 448 (1984) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(emphasis added)).
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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ance with the PKPA's procedural requirements, then it is entitled to
enforcement "without regard to the merits."" , I
While federal jurisdiction would not presently guarantee that a
child's best interests are considered, there would be some substantial
benefit to having federal courts hear these claims. Namely, this would
provide a more expeditious resolution of jurisdictional deadlock be-
tween states by allowing federal courts to "referee" jurisdictional dis-
putes between states.20 1
The only way to guarantee that courts will consider children's
best interests in the future is to establish federal substantive law, in
conjunction with federal jurisdiction, requiring courts to issue custody
decrees based upon the best interests of the child. There are two ways
this could be accomplished. First, Congress could enact legislation to
accomplish this goal.2' Second, the United States Supreme Court
could establish this rule via its appellate jurisdiction.20 3 The creation
of federal law is strongly supported by the theory that children have a
constitutional right to be placed with.parents who best suit their wel-
fare and interests.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
"'[F]rom Roman times to the mid-nineteenth century, [children]
were treated as something akin to property and had rights which
might be characterized as falling somewhere between those of slaves
and those of animals.' "204 American courts did not begin to recog-
nize children's rights until the end of the nineteenth century.205
Today, children's rights are receiving greater attention. In 1972
Henry H. Foster, Jr. and Doris Jonas Freed proposed a "Bill of Rights
for Children" including the legal right "[t]o receive parental love and
affection, discipline and guidance, and to grow to maturity in a home
environment which enables him to develop into a mature and respon-
sible adult."2' On November 20, 1989, the United Nations General
200. Krauskopf, supra note 198, at 450.
201. See Harrison, supra note 90, at Al.
202. See infra part V.B.
203. See infra part V.A.
204. George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K." A Child's Right To
Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 369 (1993) (quoting Cynthia Price Cohen, Relationships Be-
tween the Child, the Family and the State, in PERSPECrrVES ON THE FAMILY 293, 297 (Rob-
ert C.L. Moffat et al. eds., 1990)).
205. Id.
206. Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM.
L.Q. 343, 347 (1972).
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Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.20 The Convention was opened for signature on January 26,
1990.208 Sixty-one countries signed it on the first day.209 The Conven-
tion states that a child should have the right "to be heard in any judi-
cial and administrative proceedings affecting the child,' 210 and that
"[iln all actions concerning children... the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration." 211
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court is not keeping
pace in the development of children's rights. As one commentator
has noted, since the United States Constitution does not specifically
mention children, the Supreme Court has largely ignored their inter-
ests. 212 For instance, in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 213 the Court consid-
ered whether the relationship between a father and, his illegitimate
child is constitutionally protected.2 14 In that case the child, Victoria,
claimed that her constitutional rights were violated when she was de-
nied the opportunity to maintain a relationship with her biological fa-
ther.215 The Court rejected this claim, however, stating that it had no
support in the history and traditions of the United States.216 In this
case the child's interests had "little or nothing" to do with the Court's
disposition of the constitutional issues.217
This is not to say that the Supreme Court does not recognize that
children are persons with their own rights. From 1953 to 1992 the
Court heard forty-seven cases concerning children's rights.218 These
cases can be classified into three categories: (1) children's rights ver-
sus state authority; (2) parental authority to raise children versus state
authority; and (3) parents' rights versus children's rights.
207. UNrED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIrHTs, GENEVA, HuMAN RioHTs FACT
SIEET No. 10, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHMD 1 (1990).
208. Id. at 3.
209. Id. at 3-4.
210. Id. at 17.
211. Id. at 15.
212. Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution, 1992 U. i.L. L. Rnv. 1, 40; see
also Susan Gluck Mezey, Constitutional Adjudication of Children's Rights Claims in the
United States Supreme Cour4 1953-92, 27 FAM. L.Q. 307, 321 (1993) ("[A]fter the Warren
Court era, the Supreme Court increasingly resisted the child's constitutional claim.").
213. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
214. Id. at 113.
215. Id. at 130-31.
216. Id. at 131.
217. Clark, supra note 212, at 19.
218. Mezey, supra note 212, at 314. This number includes cases brought on behalf of
both the parent and child. Id. at 315.
[Vol. 28:699
INTERSTATE CUSTODY DISPUTES
The Court has recognized that children are discrete individuals
with their own rights in cases where those rights have conflicted with
state authority. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,219 the Court recognized the constitutional right of sec-
ondary school children to wear armbands to protest the Vietnam
War.220 One commentator interpreted the Court's decision as re-
jecting the approach thatthe family is a unit with "family" constitu-
tional rights and adopting the view that the family is made up of
discrete individuals with individual constitutional rights against state
authority.221 Children's rights are not equivalent to those of adults,
however. The Court has held that the state may restrict children's
constitutional rights where necessary to fulfill the state's parens pa-
triae role over children. '-
In the second category of cases, the Court has held that parents
have a fundamental interest "in the care, custody and management of
their child."''22  In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska,2' 4 the Court struck
down a law prohibiting teaching foreign languages to children who
had not yet passed the eighth grade, holding that the law violated par-
ents' rights "to control the education of their own."''22  TWo years
later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,226 the Court held that "the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control" prohibits states from requiring parents
to send their children to public schools. 227 The Court has consistently
219. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
220. Id. at 507-08.
221. Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, in LAW, SocIEry, AND DoMEsrrc
RELATIONS 125, 133 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987).
222. The Court has addressed this issue in cases arising in the public school setting.
E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985). Teachers and administrators in public schools act in loco parentis over
their students. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. To allow states to fulfill this role, the Court stated
that "the constitutional rights of students in public schools are not automatically coexten-
sive with the rights of adults in other settings." Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
223. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (referring to "liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (stating persons have liberty to "establish a home and bring up children").
224. 262 U.S. 390.
225. Id. at 401.
226. 268 U.S. 510.
227. Id. at 534-35.
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reaffirmed these rights, "recognizing a 'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter.' "'s
Often these parental rights coiflflict with children's constitutional
rights.- 9 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1979 in Bellotti v.
Baird. 30 In Bellotti four Justices held that a mature minor does not
need to seek a parent's consent before obtaining an abortion. 31
These Justices reasoned that a mature minor's exercise of a constitu-
tional right in an area as sensitive as abortion cannot be subject to a
"'veto'" by a third party. 32
In Parham v. JR. 23 3 the Court addressed the validity of a Georgia
statute that allowed parents to voluntarily commit their children to
state mental hospitals.234 The Court stated that while children have "a
substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily," "this
interest is inextricably linked with the parents' interest in and obliga-
tion for the welfare and health of the child, [thus] the private interest
at stake is a combination of the child's and parents' concerns."' 35 The
Court distinguished this from the abortion cases because, in Parham,
parents did not have an absolute right to "veto" a child's ability to
exercise a constitutional right.- 6 Because the Georgia statute re-
quired each hospital "to exercise, independent judgment as to the
child's need for confinement," the Court held that the statute was not
unconstitutional.
237
Rights of parents and children often come in direct conflict in
custody disputes.3 When this occurs, whose rights should prevail?
Most courts answer this question in favor of the parents. 39 There has
228. Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1156, 1351 (1980) [hereinafter Developments] (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 171 (1944)).
229. Id. at 1377.
230. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
231. Id. at 650. "[]f the minor satisfies a court that she has attained sufficient maturity
to make a fully informed decision, she is then entitled to make her abortion decision inde-
pendently." Id.
232. Id. at 643 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
233. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
234. Id. at 587-91.
235. Id. at 600.
236. Id. at 604.
237. Id. at 604, 620."
238. See SusAN MAIDMENT, CHLW CUSTODY AND DIVORCE: THE LAW IN SOCIAL
CoNTEXT 272 (1984); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788 & n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing "countervailing interests" of parent and child in termination proceedings).
239. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich.), stay denied sub nom. De-
Boer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1 (application for stay of enforcement made to
Justice Stevens as Circuit Justice for Sixth Circuit), and stay denied sub nom. De Boer v.
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been, however, some support for the theory that the child's interests
are superior to those of the parents.z4° One commentator has stated,
"[t]here is no justifiable reason to assume that family relationships are
any less important to the child than to a parent. Indeed, because of a
child's unique vulnerability such relationships should be presumed to
be of far greater significance to a child. ''241 The problem facing chil-
dren involved in custody disputes is that their interest in family life
has not been defined as one of constitutional magnitude by the
Supreme Court.2 42 As a result there is no uniform, national rule to
require courts to protect these interests when deciding custody cases,
and parents' rights often prevail over those of the children.
Unfortunately, the Court has historically maintained the "West-
ern civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children."243 Viewed from this perspective chil-
dren are less like individual beings with rights of their own and more
like property in which their parents have a constitutional interest.
This approach has received much criticism from the Court. Jus-
tice Jackson wrote:
Custody is viewed not with the idea of adjudicating rights in
the children, as if they were chattels, but rather with the idea
of making the best disposition possible for the welfare of the
children. To speak of a court's "cutting off" a mother's right
to custody of her children, as if it raised problems similar to
those involved in "cutting off" her rights in a plot of ground,
is to obliterate these obvious distinctions.2'
DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (application for stay of enforcement made to Justice
Blackmun referred to entire Court). "[Children... have a due process liberty interest in
their family life. However,... those interests are not independent of the child's parents."
Id. at 665; see also Treadway v. McCoy, 429 S.E.2d 492,495 (W. Va. 1993) ("'The control-
ling principle... is the welfare of the child ... ' [but] [t]his discretion is limited by the right
of the natural parent to raise his or her own child." (quoting State ex reL Kiger v. Hancock,
168 S.E.2d 798, 799 (W. Va. 1969))); Mezey, supra note 212, at 308 ("[A]lithough courts
frequently express rhetorical support for children's rights, there is little consensus over the
extent to which these rights should prevail when they encroach on parental or state
authority.").
240. In In re P the New Jersey Superior Court awarded custody to the "psychological"
parents over the natural parents because the best interests of the child were paramount to
the natural parents' interest in the custody of their child. In re P, 277 A.2d 566, 567-72
(NJ. 1971).
241. Russ, supra note 204, at 373.
242. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
243. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
244. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 541 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, Justice Brennan pointed out that children have the same
constitutional rights as their parents.24s He argued that "parental au-
thority and family autonomy cannot stand as absolute and invariable
barriers to the assertion of constitutional rights by children. ' '2A6 He
stated that "parental rights are limited by the legitimate rights and
interests of their children." 7 Therefore, parental authority will be
limited where more than a "routine child-rearing decision" results in
"a break in family autonomy." 4
Although both children and parents may be viewed as each hav-
ing their own rights, there is little doubt that while the family unit
remains intact the parents' constitutional right to the care and up-
bringing of their children will prevail. 249 When the family unit breaks
down, however, especially as a result of parental choice-such as di-
vorce or giving a child up for adoption-control over a child's future
shifts to the state?510 When the state assumes control over a child's
future, it has the power to protect the child and act in the child's wel-
fare.251 This power is derived from a state's parens patriae role to
protect those persons who are unable to protect themselves. 252 The
best interests of the child standard in custody disputes is a reflection
of this power.253
When states are placed in this parens patriae role, they should not
allow the parents' interests in custody of their children to override the
children's interests in their own upbringing.254 Once a conflict con-
cerning a child's placement arises, that child's own "inner situation
and developmental needs" should be the paramount considerations.25
Family environment is arguably the most important factor in a child's
245. Parham, 442 U.S. at 630-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
250. Burt, supra note 221, at 133.
251. 2 CLARK, supra note 1, at 477.
252. Id.
253. Sheldon G. Kirshner, Child Custody Determination-A Better Way!, 17 J. FAM. L.
275, 293 (1978-1979).
254. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Why the parent's "right" should be superior to the child's interest in receiving the
best possible care, taking into account her need for stability and affection, is a
matter the authorities seldom discuss. One might think that the constitutional
priorities should be the other way around, because the [parent]'s conduct, not the
child's, leads to the conflict.
Clark, supra note 212, at 24.
255. GoLusmswn ET AL., supra note 194, at 106.
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development. 5 6 There is a strong corrolation between a child's family
upbringing and his or her extrafamily relations." 7 A recent report
indicated that the strongest family predictors of juvenile delinquency
are lack of parental supervision, parental rejection, and low levels of
parent-child relations? 58 Current Chief Justice Rehnquist has stated,
"[a] stable, loving homelife is essential to a child's physical, emotional,
and spiritual well-being."259
When a child's placement is at issue and a state is placed in a
parens patriae role over the child, the state can fulfill its role by ensur-
ing that the child is placed in the home where it will receive parental
love, affection, discipline, and guidance.5 t ° This does not necessarily
mean placing the child with his or her biological parents.261 Third par-
ties who have established a psychological parent-child relationship are
equally capable of filling a child's parental needs. 62
Although the Court has extended some constitutional protections
to minor children,263 the Court is still unwilling to extend constitu-
tional rights to children in custody disputesm 4 This is a problem that
must be corrected. As Justices Blackmun and O'Connor have pointed
out, the Court can no longer ignore the rights and welfare of children
256. ARNOLD BINDER Er Ai., JuvENI.E DELINQuENCy 444 (1988).
257. Id. at 451.
258. Id. at 452. Parents' roles in causing juvenile delinquency has received such recogni-
tion that some states have enacted legislation holding parents criminally liable for their
children's delinquency. See generally Sharon A. Ligorsky, Note, Williams v. Garcetti
Constitutional Defects in California's "Gang-Parent" Liability Statute, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REv.
403, 403-07 (1994) (discussing California's new statute holding parents criminally liable for
their children's delinquency). These statutes have been enacted in response to the growing
problems of juvenile violence. I. at 404-05, 418-19.
259. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 788-89 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Russ, supra note
204, at 378 ("Nothing could be more fundamental to the happiness of a dependent minor
than to live with a parent or parents that meet his or her physical, psychological, and emo-
tional needs.").
260. See Foster & Freed, supra note 206, at 347.
261.. Id. at 349; see also John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to be a "Parent"? The
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991) (arguing
genetic relationship should carry little weight in determining parental status).
262. See Foster & Freed, supra note 206, at 349; see also Case Comment, Adoption:
Psychological Parenthood as the Controlling Factor in Determining the Best Interests of the
Child, 26 RUrGERS L. REV. 693 (1973) (discussing psychological parenthood rather than
natural parenthood as controlling factor in determining child's best interests).
263. See, eg., Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (extending right of privacy to minors, holding ma-
ture minor does not have to seek parental consent to obtain abortion); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (holding law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to
minors unconstitutional); Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (extending right of free speech to secondary
school children); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding implicitly that
children are protected by Equal Protection Clause).
264. See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993).
January 1995]
732 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
in the context of custody cases. 265 If the family is indeed a group of
discrete individuals with their own constitutional rights, then the
rights of children to have their best interests considered must be rec-
ognized in all custody disputes.2  When these rights conflict with
those of the parents, as they often do in custody proceedings, the
child's rights should be the paramount consideration and placement
should depend only upon the child's own emotional and developmen-
tal needs.2 67
At first glance this standard may seem like an unjust encroach-
ment on the rights of some natural parents, such as Daniel Schmidt,
who do not choose to terminate their parental rights and are not unfit
parents. Yet, in these cases courts must balance the competing inter-
ests of the two "innocent" parties-the parent and the child. As a
result, one party will suffer a loss-the parent may not gain custody
and the child may be separated from a loving family. Adults are capa-
ble of handling such losses, while a young child's personality and char-
acter are still developing; thus, courts should not consider the interests
of the parent over those of the child.268 "The rights of all children to
economic, educational, and emotional security should.., be the prime
objective of law and society whenever the courts must make a decision
affecting the life and future of children.
'269
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Children's best interests are not receiving the recognition that
they deserve. There are at least three possible solutions to this prob-
lem. First, the United States Supreme Court could recognize, based
on the discussion in Part IV of this Comment, that children's best in-
terests are the paramount consideration in all custody disputes and
that the rights and interests of children are superior to those of the
265. See DeBoer v. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 114 S. Ct. 11 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
266. Arguably, these cases do not involve routine child-rearing decisions, particularly
where the dispute arises as aresult of divorce or giving the child up for adoption. Because
extraordinary decisions lead to breaks in family autonomy, parental authority over their
children is limited. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Here, the shell
of "family autonomy" is cracked, opening the door for states to make decisions concerning
children's placement. Children's interests should be the paramount concern.
267. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 194, at 105-06. Some scholars would go so far as to
allow the child to choose the custody arrangement outright; despite any rights the parents
may otherwise have. MADMENT, supra note 238, at 274.
268. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
269. Robert F. Drinan, The Rights of Children in Modem American Family Law, in THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW Am SoCIETY' 37, 45 (Albert E.
Wilkerson ed., 1973).
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adults competing for custody. Second, Congress could enact a law es-
tablishing a uniform, substantive best interests standard in all custody
disputes and create a federal cause of action where this standard is not
met. Third, states could take the initiative to correct these problems
by establishing an interstate compact.
A. Judicial Action
In order 'to receive constitutional protection, children's rights
must be defined as fundamental. In family cases the United States
Supreme Court has looked to history and tradition as a basis for defin-
ing protected liberty interests2 70 This inquiry seeks to identify those
interests that are "so rooted in the 'traditions and [collective] con-
science of our people' that substantial intrusion would disturb the
proper balance between liberty and the demands of organized soci-
ety."27 For at least one and one-half centuries, society has recognized
that the paramount concern regarding child custody is the best inter-
ests of the child. 72 Furthermore, the Court has recognized that the
family unit is deeply rooted in the history and traditions of society and
dntitled to constitutional protection27 3 The question thus becomes:
How are the rights distributed within the family unit?
When child custody is at issue, courts have recognized only the
parents' constitutional rights and often place those rights above the
interests of the children.274 These courts have held that parents' con-
stitutional rights to the custody and care of their children supersede
the children's own rights and interests in their placement.275
However, in custody disputes states assume a parens patriae role
over children.276 How can states properly fulfill this role when par-
ents' rights are placed above those of the children? The states' goal
should be to protect the rights and interests of children, not those of
270. Developments, supra note 228, at 1177.
271. I& at 1178 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
272. Zainaldin, supra note 19,-at 682-83.
273. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); LAURENCE H.
TRmBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 15-20, 1414-15 (2d ed. 1988).
274. See supra notes 213-17, 239 and accompanying text; see also Gershon, supra note
32, at 746 (criticizing California Supreme Court for placing father's constitutional rights
above best interests of child).
275. E.g., Gershon, supra note 32, at 746; see supra note 239.
276. See supra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
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the adults competing for custody.277 Children are usually subjected to
"emotional and developmental hardships," which are losses of lib-
erty.278 Also, children's interests in custody disputes are not limited to
custody per se, but rather they include the quality of their new rela-
tionships and environment.2 79
The United States Supreme Court should recognize this interest
and require all lower courts to do the same. If the Court identifies
these interests of the child as fundamental, then the children will be
protected under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
1. Substantive due process analysis
A state may not deprive its citizens of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 80 State action that interferes with a per-
son's fundamental liberties is subject to strict scrutiny review.8 1
Under this analysis, state action must meet the following test: (1) the
state's objective must be compelling; and (2) the state action must be
narrowly tailored to achieve that objective.m2
Where courts fail to consider the best interests of children in de-
termining custody, the state is impinging on the children's liberty in-
terest in their new family relationship.8 3 Children not only have an
interest in being placed with a family, they also have an interest in
receiving parental love, affection, discipline, and guidance.284 Failing
to ensure that children are placed with parents-either biological or
psychological-who best fufill these needs impinges on their funda-
mental rights.
In custody disputes the state's compelling interest would be to
promote the welfare and interests of children.8M The conflicting inter-
277. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (stating states have interest in "preserving and promoting the welfare
of the child" in termination proceedings).
278. Kirshner, supra note 253, at 293.
279. Id. at 294.
280. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
281. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); TRIBE, supra
note 272, § 16-7, at 1454.
282. Reno v. Flores, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 1447 (1993); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,388
(1978).
283. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
285. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766; supra note 123 and accompanying text. But see
Reno, 113 S. Ct. at 1448 (" 'The best interests of the child' is... not an absolute and
exlusive constitutional criterion for the government's exercise of the custodial responsibili-
ties that it undertakes .... ).
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ests of parents would be secondary.8 Current custody laws are not
narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. This standard requires that the
state action be the least burdensome alternative to effectuate the com-
pelling interest."8 Where courts focus on parental rights and fail to
consider children's best interests in making a custody determination,
there is a great risk that the child will not be placed with the parent
who is best suited to meet the child's emotional and developmental
needs. m A less burdensome alternative would be to determine all
custody disputes based upon the best interests of the child and to
place the child's rights and interests above those of the adults
competing for custody. Because states do not apply the least burden-
some alternative, their actions violate substantive due process
requirements. 89
2. Equal protection analysis
The United States Supreme Court might also grant constitutional
protection to children through the Equal Protection Clause.zg The
Court has held that allowing certain individuals the right to exercise a
fundamental liberty while denying the same privilege to others vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause. 291 This claim was made by Baby
Jessica in the DeBoer case.292 Jessica claimed she was not receiving
equal protection under the laws because the Iowa courts do not con-
sider the best interests of the child in making custody determinations
in disputes between a natural parent and a third party, whereas the
child's best interests are considered in disputes between the natural
parents.293 The state courts dismissed this claim and the United States
Supreme Court denied review.
However, if children's interests in custody disputes are consid-
ered fundamental, then children in Jessica's position would have a
valid claim under the Equal Protection Clause. Under this analysis
state action would also be subject to strict scrutiny review. 294 This
286. Clark, supra note 212, at 24; see supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
287. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388 (holding state action not "closely tailored" because it
"unnecessarily impinge[d]" on fundamental right).
288. See Foster & Freed, supra note 206, at 349.
289. Ligorsky, supra note 258, at 423.
290. U.S. CONs-r. amend. XIV, § 1.
291. See, eg., Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374.
292. DeBoer, 502 N.W.2d at 665.
293. Id.
294. TRmE, supra note 273, § 15-20, at 1454.
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requires that the state action be the least discriminatory method of
achieving a compelling goal.295
Again, a less discriminatory method of achieving states' interests
in custody disputes would be to base all custody decisions on the best
interests of the child. Under the current scheme, some children's fun-
damental interests in placement are not considered while other chil-
dren's interests are considered via the best interests test.296 Children,
such as Jessica, may be denied the opportunity to enjoy their liberty
interest in receiving parental love, affection, discipline, and guidance
because the courts fail to consider their interests in determining their
placement.297 At the same time, other children-such as those subject
to divorce proceedings-are not denied their interest in receiving pa-
rental love, affection, discipline, and guidance because the courts do
consider their best interests in determining their placement.298
Thus, in order to survive strict scrutiny analysis all custody dis-
putes must be made based upon the best interests of the child-the
least discriminatory means of achieving the state's compelling inter-
ests in protecting the welfare and interests of children.
B. Legislative Solution
Another suggested solution is federal legislation. There are sev-
eral factors that Congress should incorporate into such legislation.
First, whenever a child's placement is at issue, the child's own needs
and best interests are the paramount consideration. 299 Second, courts
should extend the natural parent preference to third parties who have
acted as a parent toward the child.300 Furthermore, this preference
should not preclude a best interests determination; rather it should
only be one factor the courts consider in determining the child's best
interests.301 Third, courts should appoint a guardian ad litem to repre-
sent the child's interests in a custody dispute.30 Fourth, courts should
295. Ligorsky, supra note 258, at 424-28.
296. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 31-34, 104-08 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
299. GoLDsTrmN Er AL., supra note 194, at 106.
300. Richards, supra note 4, at 735. This would both protect families from interfering
third parties who happen to disapprove of the parents or their lifestyle and protect children
from being removed from a loving, stable relationship with a third party who has acted as a
parent toward the child. Id. at 736.
301. See Rose v4 Potts, 577 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
302. See Wallace, supra note 1, at 17. Some of the benefits of providing children in-
dependent counsel are: (1) it reduces the adversary character of the proceeding; (2) it
protects the child from becoming a pawn; and (3) it assists the court by bringing all rele-
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consider the child's wishes concerning placement.30 3 Finally, Congress
should explicitly provide for a federal remedy where states fail to fol-
low this enactment.
Such legislation, combined with the jurisdictional requirements of
the PKPA and UCCJA, will provide children with the'protection they
need and deserve.
However, Congressional action does not appear likely. In the
Senate hearings on the PKPA, Professor Russell M. Coombs3°4
pointed out that federal law should not "intrude into areas of exclu-
sive State responsibility" such as substantive rules regarding adjudica-
tion of custody disputes. 305 Congress apparently agreed with these
sentiments because the PKPA does not include any substantive rules
or federal enforcement provisions.
30 6
C. Interstate Compact
The aforementioned solutions both entail imposing a uniform
best interests standard on the states from the federal level-a top-
4own approach. The states could achieve the same results without
federal compulsion using their interstate compact power.30 7 The in-
terstate compact is used for state cooperation in solving common
problems. 0 8 States must receive Congress's consent before a compact
becomes effective.309
A compact would better protect children's rights than a uniform
act because of the compact's enforcement provisions. States that are
parties to a compact waive immunity from suit in federal court for
vant facts to its attention. Id. at 18. See generally Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel
for Children, 27 Fm. L.Q. 349 (1993) (arguing appointment of separate counsel for chil-
dren is necessary development).
303. See UNw. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402(2), 9A U.L.A. 147,561 (1988). See
generally Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards a Rule of Children's Choice in
Custody Determinations, 49 U. MiAMi L. REv. (Forthcoming 1994) (arguing children above
age six should have absolute right to choose when dispute is between two fit parents).
304. Professor Coombs is a law professor at Rutgers University Law School. Hearings,
supra note 79, at 143.
305. 1& at 146.
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988); supra parts I.B.1-2; notes 110,178-80 and accompa-
nying text.
307. "'The Compact,' ... 'adapts to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-
making power of independent sovereign nations."' THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNrrED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 419 (Lester S. Jayson et al. eds.,
1973) (quoting Hinderlider v. La Plata Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104 (1938)).
308. Id. at 421.
309. Md at 421-22.
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actions arising under the compact 10 This would provide for federal
enforcement of any substantive provisions of the compact. Thus,
states would maintain their autonomy in fashioning substantive family
law, while providing aggrieved parties with a federal forum to compel
state compliance with the state laws.
Such a compact should contain the same provisions suggested for
federal legislation.311 However, this solution would not be as effective
as federal action. It is very unlikely that all fifty states will reach an
agreement of this nature in the area of child custody where state laws
are so diverse. On the other hand, this solution may be more likely
than federal action in light of federal views regarding substantive fam-
ily law. The federal government routinely abstains from encroaching
on state power in this arena.312 Thus, while less effective, it is more
likely that states-at least some of them-will act themselves. Such
action would be consistent with historical perceptions of federalism in
the area of family law.
D. Problems Associated with the Best Interests Test
Applying the best interests test to all custody disputes admittedly
has some shortcomings. First, if strictly applied, it could lead to third
parties-such as neighbors-filing for custody claiming that they
would make better parents than the present ones3 3 This could, if
misapplied, create the possibility that parents who are not unfit will
lose their children to third parties because they happen to be wealth-
ier or live in a better neighborhood.3 4 This problem could be allevi-
ated, however, by passing a statute such as the one passed by the
Washington legislature that "provides that petitions may be brought
by third parties 'if the child is not in the physical custody of one of its
parents or if the petitioner alleges that neither parent is a suitable
custodian.' ",315 Second, the best interests test is criticized for being
very broad and giving judges considerable discretion in fashioning cus-
tody decrees. 16 This has led some judges to be overprotective while
310. Id. at 423.
311. See supra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
312. See supra parts IH.B.1-2; notes 305-06 and accompanying text.
313. See Richards, supra note 4, at 760.
314. However, this Comment is not suggesting that the best interests standard be uti-
lized by the state to initiate termination proceedings.
315. Richards, supra note 4, at 759 (quoting WAsH. Rnv. CODE § 26.10.030(1) (Supp.
1991)).
316. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See generally Carl E. Schneider, Discre-
tion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MicH. L.
[Vol. 28:699
INTERSTATE CUSTODY DISPUTES
trying to safeguard children's best interests and, in a few cases, caused
harm to these children.317 Despite these criticisms, some discretion is
necessary, particularly in custody determinations, given the diversity
of situations facing the courts and the various factors that influence
the quality of a child's home.318
No system is perfect. However, this cannot be used as an excuse
to continue ignoring children's welfare and interests. Children are our
future and when courts are placed in a position to protect their inter-
ests-in custody disputes for instance-they should do just that. A
child's home is vital to the child's welfare and development.319 Courts
should consider children's rights and interests above all others when
making decisions regarding their placement.32
VI. CONCLUSION
A child's best interests deserve more than rhetoric. Courts and
legislatures have an obligation to protect a child's interests. However,
the action taken thus far has fallen short of ensuring that these inter-
ests are actually protected. Children should not be trapped within the
jurisdictional and policy barriers erected by antiquated notions of fed-
eral responsibility and children's rights.
At the very least, the UCCJA and PKPA should allow a sister
state to make a best interests determination where another state has
failed to do so. Children are not "pawns" or property, they are people
with rights and interests that need to be recognized. Jurisdictional de-
vices of our judicial system should not prevent these interests from
being heard. 21
Ideally, either the United States Supreme Court or Congress
should establish federal law requiring states to recognize the rights
and interests of the child above all parental rights whenever a child's
placement is at issue. This will create a uniform law protecting the
REv. 2215 (1991) (discussing criticisms of discretion in best interests test, exploring possi-
ble alternatives, and striking balance between rules and discretion).
317. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text; see also Cheri L. Wood, Comment,
The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Dangerous Aura of Reliability, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv.
1367,1370-72 (1994) (noting how best interests standard leads courts to consider-to detri-
ment of children-parental alienation syndrome when determining custody).
318. See Schneider, supra note 316, at 2218-19.
319. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text.
320. GoLDSTiN ET At., supra note 194, at 106.
321. "A custody dispute is more than a jurisdictional chess game in which winning de-
pends on compliance with predetermined rules of play. A child is not a pawn." In re
Marriage of Ieronimakis, 831 P.2d 172,190 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(citing E.E.B. v. D.A., 446 A.2d 871, 879-80 (N.J. 1982)).
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welfare and interests of children. Anything short of this will leave
room for states to continue denying children their liberty interests at
the expense of parental rights, ."[T]he cardinal principle which should
guide the courts and the law and 'the Congress in this matter is the
welfare of the children because they are the real losers in this
desperate game. Their best interests should be our foremost
consideration."
322
Jerry A. Behnke*
322. Hearings, supra note 79, at 2 (quoting Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.).
* This Comment is dedicated to my loving family-Morn, Mike, Phillip, Carl, and
Deena. I would like to thank Professor Lisa C. Ikemoto for her insightful remarks on
earlier drafts of this Comment and Professor Christopher May for his helpful advice. Spe-
cial thanks to my Grandfather, Miley, for his patience and support. I would like to express
my appreciation to Dr. Karen Daniel, Ph.D., my high school English teacher, who taught
me to write clearly and think critically and inspired me to pursue a career in law.
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